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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellate jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to §78-2-
2(3) (1) Utah Code Ann. . This case was poured over to the Court 
of Appeals pursuant to §78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant is in the business of providing cemetery and 
mausoleum spaces, funeral services, markers, caskets, and 
similar products. From 1972 to 1974, Defendant began a mausoleum 
sales program called "public relations sales program." (Moore 
depo. p. 12). Mausoleums were to be located at a Redwood Road 
location and one at 3115 East 7800 South called the "Mountain 
View" location. Under this program, one-half the spaces of a 
proposed mausoleum were sold to families before construction (Id. 
at 9, 14-15). Once one-half of the mausoleum spaces were sold, 
construction would begin. (Id.) This is called "pre-need" 
because the sale is made before the time of death. (Id. at 8.) 
The sales program represented to consumers that the pre-need 
price was at cost and did not include a profit. (Id. at 9.) 
Sometime in 1973 or 1974, a salesman for defendant, 
Bill Nordin, called on the Schoney family to sell them spaces 
in a mausoleum. (Nordin depo. p.8.) After hearing Nordin's 
1 
"usual presentation," the Schoneys purchased two spaces in an 
unconstructed mausoleum. (Nordin depo. p.9; Exhibit 1 to 
plaintiff's Complaint-) The purchase agreement (labeled the 
"Mausoleum Estate Agreement") obligated defendant in part: 
To provide use of the full service chapel . . . 
• • • 
To complete the mausoleum with construc-
truction. . . within one year from the date 
that the Public Relations Development Pro-
gram on that is completed. 
(Exhibit 1 to plaintiff's Complaint). The contract does not 
specify whether the spaces were to be at the Redwood Road or 
Mountain View Mausoleum. 
Nordin showed the Schoneys a drawing that laid out the 
crypt locations in the mausoleum. (George Schoney depo p. 10.) 
George and Erma selected two specific crypts located "at eye 
level". (Id. at 10,11). George Schoney testified that the 
mausoleum space he purchased was "the Memorial Estates in the 
east side" (Id. at 19) commonly known as the Mountain View 
location (Id. at 20). See also George Schoney depo. p. 21, 22 
"[the family] didn't want to be buried over there on the west 
side anyway. . . " Erma Schoney depo. p. 4-5, 9) Nordin 
represented that a chapel had been started at the Mountain View 
location (Id. at 22). He further stated that the Schoneys would 
have access to the Mountain View chapel and be able to have 
funeral services at the chapel. (Id. at 22). 
Nordin promised that the Schoneys would have use of 
the chapel at no charge (Erma Schoney depo, p. 8). He also 
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stated that the money from the Schoney's purchase would be 
specifically used for construction of the mausoleum. (Id.) Paul 
Moore, former general sales manager for defendant from 1960-1966, 
and a sales representative from 1972-1974 (Moore depo. p. 4, 5) 
confirmed that it was his understanding that the money would be 
used for building the mausoleum. (Id. at 9, 14, 15). 
During Nordin's presentation, he showed the Schoneys 
pictures of the chapel and proposed mausoleum at Mountain View. 
(George Schoney depo. p. 9). Moore agreed that it was a standard 
policy to show an artists drawing of what the mausoleum would 
look like. (Moore depo. p 22, 23). The drawing was identified 
as Exhibit 1 to the Moore deposition. 
Several months after the Schoneys had purchased pre-
need spaces at Mountain View, Erma's father (Clint Wheeler) died. 
(Erma Schoney depo. p. 9). It had always been the intent of the 
Schoneys and Erma's parents to be interred together at Mountain 
View. (Affidavit of Erma Schoney, 1/5/88 para. 1, 2). Because 
the Mountain View mausoleum was not built, Erma had no choice but 
to have her father buried in the ground as a temporary 
arrangement. (Erma Schoney depo. p. 9). This temporary ground 
burial was induced by defendant's promise that "he [Ermafs 
father] would only be there [i.e. in the ground] about six 
months." (Id.) (See also George Schoney depo. p. 41 "he would 
be moved in six months.") Erma and her family were "strongly 
opposed to ground burial" for personal reasons. (Erma Schoney 
affidavit, para. 5; Erma Schoney depo. p. 18.) Because the 
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Schoneys were assured that Clinton Wheeler's ground burial was 
only temporary, no marker was placed on his grave. (Affidavit of 
Erma Schoney, para. 5). 
After Clinton Wheeler's burial in 1974 , Erma and her 
mother went to the Mountain View cemetery "lots of times" to "see 
if they were building it [i.e. the mausoleum]." (Erma Schoney 
depo. p. 11). Erma was "very concerned" about it and "worried". 
(Id.) Erma asked the defendant when the mausoleum was to be 
built. (Id.) George also testified that he went "once a year" to 
see about the building of the mausoleum (George Schoney depo. p. 
40). Defendant "told George that it would be started in the 
near future; this went on for 8 years. (Id. at 42). 
Eventually, George was told that "there wasn't enough 
people interested at the present time for them to build a 
mausoleum." (Id. at 48-49). George got the impression that "they 
would never build it." (Id.). It was in 1981 that George 
decided defendant wasn't going to build a mausoleum, and so he 
and Erma and Mrs. Wheeler purchased alternate spaces at Sunset 
Lawn mausoleum. (Id. at p. 43, 45). The Schoneys alleged that 
this was on or before March 29, 1981. (Second Amended Complaint, 
para. 11). 
During the passing years, defendant failed to keep 
track of the unmarked 'grave of Clinton Wheeler. (Affidavit of 
Erma Schoney, para. 7). Erma and defendant disagreed as to where 
Wheeler was buried. (Erma Schoney depo. p. 16). As a result, 
defendant's agent "had to use a long metal probe to locate the 
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casket." (Affidavit of Erma Schoney, para. 7; Erma Schoney depo. 
p. 16). Erma averred that "to disturb his grave in this manner 
was very distressful to us." (Id.). 
Sometime prior to about 1977f the cemetery chapel at 
Mountain View was completed. The Schoneys alleged that the 
cemetery chapel was rented as office space. (Fifth Amended 
Complaint, para. 31). This was conceded in Mr. Holt's deposition 
where he stated that the salesmen "know that the area of the 
building that will eventually house the pews and the whole 
operation is currently office space..." (Holt depo. p. 42; R. 
1399). Defendant instead substituted use of L.D.S. chapels 
which were provided to defendant free of charge. (Id. at p. 44). 
The chapel was rented to defendant's previous company, Security 
National Life Insurance Co. (Quist depo. Ex. 1 and 2). The total 
proceeds received by defendant from renting the cemetery chapel 
is at least $200,000. (Quist depo. exhibits 3-11). 
After the Schoneys decided that defendant was not going 
to build a mausoleum at Mountain View in the foreseeable future, 
they purchased substitute mausoleum spaces in an existing 
mausoleum at Sunset Lawn. (Erma Schoney depo. p. 12). Erma 
averred that: 
Before my mother died, we asked Memorial 
Estates to release my father's body so it 
would be placed next to his wife at Sunset 
Lawn when she died. Memorial Estates 
refused. Finally, on the morning of my 
mother's funeral, they released his body. 
This was severely distressing and upsetting 
to us, to be faced with the inability to lay 
my parents to rest together. Even more 
upsetting was the fact that my mother never 
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knew she would be able to be interred with 
her husband. 
(Affidavit of Erma Schoneyf paragraph 8.) George testified that 
"right up until the night before the funeral, we didn't know but 
what we were going to have him in one place and her in another 
place. . . " (Id.). George confirmed that Erma "spent a lot of 
nights worrying about it . . . it caused a lot of grief." 
(George Schoney depo. p. 47-48). 
George stated that he "still had the nightmare, until 
we found another place [i.e. Sunset Lawn] that I could be there 
any time, the same way." (Id. at 46). 
When defendant finally relented and allowed Mr. Wheeler 
to be disinterred and transferred to Sunset Lawn, the Schoneys 
learned that there had been water damage to Kr. Wheeler's casket 
due to what appeared to be poor materials used. (George Schoney 
depo. p. 4 7). 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Class Certification: 
The Schoneys brought their claims individually and on 
behalf of a class of pre-need consumers of defendant's services. 
On February 10, 1983, the action was certified as a class action 
by Judge Fishier. (R. 202). The class was defined as "all those 
persons who have signed a standard form agreement for the 
purchase of mausoleum space from the defendant." (R. 294). On 
February 10, 19 84, defendant moved to have the class decer-
tified. (R. 487). On June 24
 f 1985, Judge Dee entered an order 
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decertifying the class. (R. 704). Judge Dee refused to enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the 
decertification order. (R. 681). Plaintiffs successfully 
obtained a writ of mandamus requiring Judge Dee to enter findings 
of fact and conclusions of law to support decertification. (R. 
998). Judge Dee's findings and conclusions were entered on 
December 4, 1985. (R. 1053). 
Discovery: 
Plaintiffs served interrogatories on defendant on June 
17, 1982. (R. 12). Defendant answered the interrogatories on 
August 27,1982, approximately 26 days late. (R. 50). Plaintiff 
submitted to defendant a second request for documents on January 
28, 1983. (R> 197). No answer has ever been filed. The Schoneys 
submitted a third request for documents on March 1,1983- (R. 
225). No response has ever been filed. 
Defendant submitted a second set of interrogatories on 
July 11, 1983, to the Schoneys. (R. 328A). They timely responded 
30 days later on August 11, 1983. (R. 356). 
The initial round of discovery was completed by August 
11, 1983. No further discovery was conducted until June 12, 
1987, when plaintiffs submitted further interrogatories and 
another request for documents. Defendant sought and received an 
extension of time until* September 15, 1987, to answer discovery. 
(R. 1121). A discovery cut-off was imposed of December 8, 1987, 
and a trial date of December 7, 1988 set. (R. 1136). Defendant 
did not answer by September 15. Finally, on October 28, 1987, 
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the Schoneys' counsel sent a letter reminding defendant of its 
discovery obligation and delay. (R. 1164). Defendant partially 
answered plaintiff's discovery by mailing interrogatory answers 
on November 24, 1987. (R. 1166). This was 13 days before 
discovery cut-off. Plaintiff was forced to bring a motion to 
compel further answers on December 8, 1987. (R. 1150). This 
motion was granted, in part, by order entered December 23, 1987. 
The Schoneys also requested more time to do follow-up discovery 
because of defendant's late and incomplete answers. This request 
was denied. (R. 1187). 
Meanwhile, defendant sent discovery to plaintiffs on 
June 26, 1987. Plaintiffs' answers were filed (without objection 
from defendant) on August 13, 1987. Defendant claims to have 
sent a final set of interrogatories and requests for documents to 
plaintiffs' counsel on April 29, 1988. These were answered on 
June 20, 1988. Because the answers were 18 days late, Judge 
Moffat struck plaintiffs' complaint and entered default judgment 
against them. 
Trial Settings: 
Plaintiff first certified the case for trial on Kay 3, 
1983. (R. 263). Defendant objected. (R. 269). Plaintiff again 
certified the case on September 13, 1983. (R. 390). Upon Judge 
Leary's poor health, plaintiff moved for a new trial judge to 
avoid delay. (R. 522). 
Plaintiffs certified the case as ready for trial on 
April 22, 1986. (R. 1067). 3y scheduling order of September 22, 
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1986, the case was given a first place trial setting on February 
9, 1987. (R. 1069). However, Judge Dee suddenly retired 
effective January 31, 1987. Plaintiff requested a special pro 
tempore judge to prevent delay of a trial. (R. 1085). This was 
denied. By scheduling order of May 14, 1987, the case was given 
a trial date of August 24, 1987. (R. 1096). Upon defendant's 
request for a continuance, the trial date was changed to December 
7, 1987. (R. 1136). This was again changed to February 1, 1988 
upon defendant's request. (R. 1139). Upon the court's own 
motion, the trial was continued. (R. 1301). Upon plaintiff's 
request (R. 1336 and 1338), the case was reset for trial on July 
6, 1988. (R. 1360). 
Summary Judgment: 
On February 10, 1984, defendant moved for summary 
judgment as to all causes of action in plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint. (R. 494). On June 24, 1985, Judge Dee entered an 
order denying defendant's motion. (R. 693). Defendant filed a 
second motion for summary judgment as to all causes in this 
complaint on December 29, 1987.(R. 1200). This motion was in all 
material respects the same as the February 10, 1987 motion. This 
second motion was denied by Judge Moffat on January, 1988. (R. 
1301). Defendant filed a third motion for summary judgment on 
June 14, 1988. (R. 136*3). This motion was granted by Judge 
Moffat as to all causes in plaintiffs' complaint on June 27, 
1988. (R. 1377). 
Q 
POINT 
DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PLACE 
75% OF THE SCHONEY'S PAYMENTS IN TRUST UNDER 
U.C.A. 22-4-1 
A. Claim for Breach of Trust - 22-4-1. 
Utah Code Ann. §22-4-1 required defendant to maintain 
75% of the money paid by pre-need plaintiffs in a trust. The 
statute at the time of plaintiffs' purchase applied when "money 
is paid for a purpose of finishing or performing funeral services 
or the furnishing or delivery of any personal property, merchan-
dise, or services of any nature to be conveyed or delivered at 
any time. . . for future use at a time determinable by the death 
of the person ...". §22-4-1. The act excludes "cemetery lots, 
vaults, mausoleum crypts, niches, cemetery burial privileges, and 
cemetery space..." (Emphasis added). Plaintiff claimed that the 
exclusion for "mausoleum crypts" did not extend to unconstructed 
mausoleum crypts. 
The legislature amended §22-4-1 in 1983 to include: 
personal property, merchandise, or services 
of any nature to be conveyed or delivered at 
any time ... including ...unconstructed 
mausoleum crypts..." 
B. §22-4-1 f 1971) Required a 75% Trust. 
Pre-need sales have been so flagrantly abused in the 
cemetery business, that over half the states have enacted pre-
need laws. These laws require that money paid under a pre-need 
cemetery contract be held in trust. The case of Utah Funeral 
Directors v. Memorial Gardens of the Valleyy 408 P.2d 190, 17 
Utah 2d 227 (1965), explains the purpose of these statutes: 
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One of the main purposes of the pre-need laws 
is to make sure that after the solicitations 
of such contracts, the embalming and funeral 
services will be furnished as contracted to 
the extent that the trust funds and earnings 
can accomplish this. 17 Utah 2d at 232. 
State v. Anderson, 408 P.2d 864 (Kan. 1965) added: 
[Because of] a great time lag between the 
time of beginning and performance . . . there 
is a public interest in the protection of 
funds intended for a particular purpose, from 
whatever hazard, whether the normal vicissi-
tudes of business, or plain fraud and deceit. 
The statute as originally written in 1971 shows from 
its face that it meant to cover pre-need arrangements. The title 
refers to trusts for "pre-arranged funeral plans," and indicated 
a broad reading of that phrase to include "any agreement" to 
provide property and services in the future at the time of death. 
The sale of pre-need mausoleum space fits this intention. The 
exceptions list what are normally understood to be existing 
property and services. This would not include pre-need mausoleum 
spaces. The purpose of protecting pre-need consumers would be 
frustrated by a reading excluding pre-need mausoleum sales from 
the trust protection. 
Defendant's claim was that it was selling "mausoleum 
crypts." However, defendant did not sell a mausoleum crypt. It 
sold the right to the use of a non-existent piece of personal 
property at a time determined by the plaintiff's death. 
Defendant sold a promise to build a crypt (services) to be 
performed in the future. Thus, the 7 5% trust exemption for 
"mausoleum crypts" should not apply. 
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C. If 22-4-1 (1971) Was Unclear, Then The 1983 Revision Should 
Apply Retroactively. 
The 1983 legislature made explicit that the 75% trust 
applied to unconstructed mausoleum crypts. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held "when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify 
the meaning of an earlier enactment, the amendment may be applied 
retroactively in pending actions." State, Dept. of Soc. Services 
v. Hides, 656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982) ..." Shelter America 
Corp. v. Ohio Cas. & Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah App. 
1987). The 1971 version was at least unclear whether the 75% 
trust applied to pre-need unconstructed mausoleum crypts. The 
1983 amendments made clear the intent of the prior enactment, and 
the amendment should apply in pending actions such as this one. 
Further, since the operation of a cemetery is impressed 
with a public purpose, any contract implicitly includes a clause 
rendering the contract subject to any changes made in the laws. 
Diamant v. Mnt. Pleasant Westchester Cemetery Corp., 2 01 N.Y.S. 
2d 861 (Sup. 1960); Grove Hill Realty Co. v. Fercliff Ass'n., 198 
N.Y.S. 2d 287 (A.D. 1960). Silver Ktn. Cem. Ass'n v. Simon, 231 
N.Y.S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Similarly, each contract has an 
implied term that the performance of the contract will comply 
with any applicable law. Hall v. Karrsn, 632 P. 2d 848 (Utah 
1980). Thus, the Schoneys are entitled, at a minimum, to 
interest on 75% of her contract payments from 1983 to the 
present. 
POINT 
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THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD 
BREACHED THE SCHONEYS' CONTRACT BY DELAYING 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE MOUNTAIN VIEW MAUSOLEUM 
A. Claim for Delay in Construction. 
Plaintiffs claimed defendant was obligated to build a 
mausoleum at Mountain View "within one year from the date that 
the Public Relations Development Program on that unit is 
completed." (Mausoleum Sales Agreement, para, headed "Design and 
Construction; " Fifth Amended Complaint, para. 2.) It was 
conceded by defendants that the Public Relation Development 
Program is completed upon sale of 1/2 of the spaces in the 
mausoleum. (Tr. at p. 22-24). Plaintiff claimed that defen-
dants delayed the actual completion of the Public Relations 
Development Program by voluntarily abandoning sales of the 
mausoleum spaces. (Fifth Amended Complaint, para. 3-5). 
B. Defendant's Oblioation to Build a Mausoleum Began one Year 
After it Stopped Selling Mausoleum Spaces at Mountain View. 
The completion of the Public Relations Development 
Program was a condition precedent to defendant's performance. 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985). Because the 
fulfillment of the conditions was dependent on defendant's acts 
(i.e. sales of mausoleum spaces), it was required to make a good-
faith effort to complete the conditions. Connor v. Stevens 
School of Business, 560 P.2d 13B3 (Utah 1977). When a good faith 
effort is not made, the condition is deemed fulfilled. Conner, 
supra. Thus, defendant's obligation to build began one year from 
the time it failed to make a good-faith effort to fulfill the 
conditions by selling 1/2 of the spaces. 
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As early as 1975, defendants had abandoned its active 
efforts to fulfill the conditions by selling pre-need mausoleum 
spaces. (Keith Hughes depo., p. 35). A jury could have 
reasonably found that a good-faith effort to fulfill the 
condition would require at the least an active continuing effort 
to sell 1/2 of the spaces. Defendants put no evidence in the 
record that their abandonment was beyond their control. A jury 
could have concluded that defendant's obligation to build was 
triggered when efforts to sell 1/2 the spaces were stopped. 
Defendant also contended that plaintiff bought space at 
Redwood Road and that because a mausoleum was built in 1976, 
there was no breach. (Tr. at p. 13). However, the Schoneys 
alleged that they bought mausoleum space at Mountain View. This 
was supported by the affidavit or Erma Schoney and deposition 
testimony of both Erma and George Schoney. Because the evidence 
was conflicting as to whether plaintiffs bought at Mountain View 
or Redwoodf the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on 
the basis that a mausoleum was timely built at Redwood Road. 
POINT 
THE SCHONEYS CLAIM THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
BUILD THE MAUSOLEUM AS PROMISED SHOULD BE 
SENT TO A JURY. 
A. Claim for Breach of Warranty. 
Plaintiff claimed she was shown a drawing of the 
mausoleum intended for Mountain view. (Fifth Amended Complaint, 
para 8.) She alleged that the mauscleum as built was different, 
i A 
and of inferior quality. The Mountain View mausoleum was built 
in 1985. (Answer to Interrogatory 5f November 24, 1987). 
B. The Statute of Limitations Beoan to Run When the Mountain 
View Mausoleum Was Built in 1985. 
Defendant contended that plaintiff had bought space at 
Redwood and, therefore, the wrongf if any, began upon completion 
of the 1976 Redwood mausoleum. (Tr. at p. 18). Of course, the 
Schoneys' testimony was always that they bought at Mountain View. 
Thus, the statute of limitations began to run in 1985 when the 
Mountain View mausoleum was constructed. Defendant made no claim 
that plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty was untimely if it 
related to the Mountain View mausoleum. 
C. There was No Evidence in the Record that the Mountain View 
Mausoleum (As Built) was the Same as the Mausoleum Shown to 
Plaintiffs. 
There was no evidence in the record that the Mountain 
View mausoleum looked like the drawing shown to the plaintiffs in 
1973. Defendant's counsel opined that "the two mausoleums are 
substantially the same." (Tr. p. 17). However, Moore stated at 
his deposition that the mausoleum as shown, and the mausoleum as 
built, were "absolutely" not the same. (Moore depo. p. 24). 
Moore stated the constructed one was "inferior" and an "eyesore." 
(Id. at 24-25). A jury might or might not share that opinion. 
Because the trial court had no basis to decide whether the 
mausoleum was built as represented, summary judgment was 
inappropriate. 
POINT 
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WHETHER THE CHAPEL WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE 
SCHONEYS TO USE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The Schoneys' Claim for Wrongful Rental of the Cemetery 
Chapel. 
The Schoneys alleged that defendant rented out the 
cemetery chapel from 1977 to 1984 as office space. (Fifth 
Amended Complaint, para 31.) The Schoneys sought an order 
requiring a restitution of the chapel rental proceeds to the 
owners of cemetery plots and mausoleum spaces who were entitled 
to use of the chapel.. (Id. at p. 18). 
B. There was no Factual Basis for This Court to Conclude that 
the Chaoel was not Rented out and Unavailable for Funeral 
Services. 
There was no evidence in the record that the chapel 
was not rented to Security National Life. Instead, the evidence 
in the record shows that salesmen for defendant were told "the 
area that will eventually house the pews and the whole operation 
is currently office space." (Holt depo. p. 42). Further, if 
the chapel was not being rented and was available, why would 
defendant substitute use of LDS chapels for funerals? (Id. at 
44). The only basis the court had to support defendant's motion 
was defendant's counsel's statement that there was an uncon-
troverted affidavit that there was a chapel available at Mountain 
View. (Tr. at 19, 51). There is no such affidavit. The trial 
court was unaware of such a basis (Tr. at p. 48). The Schoney's 
counsel specifically represented to the trial court that the 
chapel was not available because there was an insurance company 
in there. (Tr, at p. 47). 
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The reason that there was next-to-nothing in the record 
as to whether the Mountain View chapel was available is because 
that claim was first made at oral argument. The Schoneys had, in 
fact, made a formal request for entry onto land for the express 
purpose of taking photographs of the chapel filled with desks, 
filing cabinets, and etc. Had either counsel or the court known 
of that basis for defendant's motion, an evidentiary record could 
have been made. As it was, all the trial court had was the 
assertion of defendant's counsel that a chapel was available, and 
the assertion of the Schoney's counsel that the chapel was not 
available. Such is not the stuff of which summary judgments can 
be made. 
C. The Schoneys Could Sue to Redress a Past Use of the Cemetery 
Chapel for Non-Cemetery Purposes. 
A cemetery may not be put to any use inconsistent with 
repose of the dead. Vidrine v. Vidrine, 225 So. 2d 6691 (La. 
App. 969); Michels v. Crouch, 122 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1938);Wino v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Assn, 101 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 
1940); Benson v. Lakewood Cemetery, 267 N.W. 510 (Minn. 19 36) ; 
Moore v. U.S. Cremation Co., 9 N.E.2d 795 (N.Y.); Hertle v. 
Riddell, 106 S.W. 2B2 (Ken. 1907); Frank v. Cloverleaf Park 
Assn, 148 A.2d 488 (N.J. 1959); Connolly v. Frobeniurs, 574 P.2d 
971 (Kan. App. 1978); Arlington Cem. Co. v. Hoffman, 119 S.5. 696 
(Ga. 1961). This prohibition is grounded in the idea that 
cemetery management are trustees. See e.g. Dennis v. Glenwood 
Cemetery, 130 A. 373 (N.J. 1924); Braun v. Maolewood Cemetery 
Assjji, 89 N.W. 872 (Minn. 1902); Mines v. State, 149 S.W. 1058 
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(Tenn. 1911); Cave Hill Cemetery v. Gosnell, 161 S.W. 980 (Ky. 
App. 1913). 
Use of the cemetery chapel for insurance offices is a 
flagrant abuse of the interests and rights of the consumers who 
have purchased cemetery lots and mausoleum spaces. A court of 
equity should be available to redress such an abuse, 
POINT 
THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT CONCLUDE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT NO FRAUD HAD BEEN 
PRACTICED ON THE SCHONEYS. 
A. The Schonevs' Claim for Fraud: 
The Schoneys alleged that defendant had represented 
that the Schoneys had purchased specific mausoleum spaces. 
(Fifth Amended Complaint, para 18). This allegation was 
supported by the deposition testimony of the Schoneys' that they 
selected specific mausoleum spaces when Nordin made the sale to 
them. (George Schoney depo. p. 10-11). Moore's testimony also 
confirmed that specific spaces were sold. 
The reality is that defendant sold many more mausoleum 
spaces than it actually had. (Fifth Amended Complaint, para. 17, 
19). This fact was not explained to the Schoneys. (Id. at para. 
19). Actually, defendant stopped assigning specific crypt 
spaces in 1973 or 1974 (Smith depo. p. 37). This was about the 
time the Schoneys purchased. Thus, the specific mausoleum spaces 
people (like the Schoneys) thought they were buying were non-
existent . 
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Defendant's argument to the trial court was that the 
Schoneys had "not alleged" there was never a crypt available to 
them. (Tr. at p. 31). Defendant's intent was to substitute a 
crypt space at Redwood Road. Of course, the Schoneys did not 
want "any" crypt; they had purchased a specific crypt space at a 
specific location (Mountain View). The fact that defendant could 
have substituted a different crypt in a different location merely 
points up the fraud. The tactic is a kind of bait and switch; 
consumers think they're getting one thing, but another is 
substituted. The trial court erred by concluding as a matter of 
law that the Schoneys could not prove fraud. 
POINT 
THE SCHONEYS' CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLIC-
TION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WAS NOT TIME-
BARRED. 
A. The Schoneys' Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress. 
The Schoneys pleaded a claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress in their Second Amended Complaint filed 
June 6, 1983 (Count 10). They repleaded this theory in their 
Fifth Amended Complaint of January 26, 1988. 
B. The Statute of Limitations. 
Defendants ' ground for dismissing the count for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress was "the statute of 
limitations on that claim has run." (Tr. at p. 25). No claim 
was made that facts alleged did not state a cause of action. 
Defendant claimed that the relation back provision of Rule 15(a) 
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did not apply because the wrong or liability alleged in the Fifth 
Amended complaint was different from that in the second Amended 
Complaint, and it required different proof. Defendant calculated 
the four-year limitation period from Kay 22, 19 82. (Tr. at p. 
49). 
C. Legal Standard and Standard of Appellate Review. 
If the intentional infliction count alleged in the 
Fifth Amended Complaint "arose out of the conduct, transaction 
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
[Second Amended Complaint], the amendment relates back . . . " . 
Rule 15(c). Since the question is answered solely by comparing 
the two pleadings, the appellate court simply reviews for error. 
D. The Schonevs ' Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distr 
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Defendant's counsel represented that the Schoneys' 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the 
Fifth Amended Complaint was a new cause of action brought up for 
the first time. (Tr. p. 25). Actually, the Schoneys pleaded a 
separate claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
in the Second Amended Complaint of June 6, 1983, just over one 
year from the culmination of the entire transaction between the 
named parties. (Second Amended Complaint, para. 53). Under Rule 
15(c), the claim for intentional infliction in the Fifth Amended 
Complaint related back to at least the Second Amended Complaint. 
The following allegations in the Fifth Amended 
Complaint show substantial similarity with those in the Second 
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Amended Complaint. Included are citations to the April 1, 1983 
depositions of the Schoneys for the facts more specifically 
alleged in the Fifth Amended Complaint. Defendant was on notice 
of these facts since at least that time. The allegations which 
are bracketed were taken from the Second Amended Complaint: 
[Defendant's advertising program is designed 
to promise customers a sense of peace, 
comfort and security through the purchase of 
"pre-need" mausoleum space and related 
services. Plaintiffs have paid money in good 
faith. However, defendants have failed to 
provide peace, comfort, and security.] 
(Verbatim, Second Amended Complaint, para. 
53.) 
Defendant's knew, or should have known, that 
named plaintiffs were opposed to ground bur-
ial for philosophical and personal reasons. 
(Erma Schoney depo. p. IB, April , 1983). 
[Plaintiffs agreed to a ground burial for 
Clinton Wheeler in 1974 in reliance on 
defendant's express promise that he would not 
be there more than several (less than six) 
months.] (George Schoney depo. p. 16). (cf. 
Second Amended Complaint, para. 14, 
regarding defendant's scheme to substitute 
cheaper ground plots.) 
Further, because of the temporary nature of 
the interment, his grave was not marked. 
(Erma Schoney depo. p.16) 
[However, defendants intentionally or 
recklessly delayed building the mausoleum for 
years.] (cf 2d. Comolaint^ oara. 12, 13, 20, 
43-48.) 
Moreover, with the passage cf time, defen-
dants lost track of the location. (Erma 
Schoney depo. p. 16). Ultimately, defendants 
were forced to use a long metal probe to 
locate the grave. (Id. at 11.) 
[Due to the long delay, and defendants' 
stated intention not to build the mausoleum, 
plaintiffs' purchased other mausoleum space 
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at Sunset Lawn.] (Id. at 11-12) (Second 
Amended Complaint, para 11). 
When plaintiff Erma Schoney's mother died, 
she was interred at the Sunset Lawn. 
Defendants intentionally refused to allow the 
father of plaintiff Erma Schoney to be 
disinterred, and reinterred at Sunset Lawn 
with his wife. (George Schoney depo. p. 4 5-
4 6.) Finally on the morning of the funeral, 
defendants relented and allowed plaintiff 
Erma Schoney's father to be transferred. (Id. 
at 47-48). 
[Defendants' conduct, together with the acts 
alleged above, has caused great turmoil and 
severe emotional distress to the named 
plaintiffs. Defendants' conduct was done 
wilfully and in reckless disregard for their 
rights and sensibilities.] (Second Amended 
Complaint, para. 53.) 
A reasonable person should have known that 
defendants' conduct would cause such severe 
emotional distress. (New allegations). 
Thus, the allegations in the Fifth Amended Complaint 
are nothing more than a compilation of allegations from the 
Second Amended Complaint, as more particularly set forth in the 
Schoneys' depositions of April 1, 1983. 
POINT 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROPERLY SERVE A 
FORMAL SUGGESTION OF DEATH, THE ACTION WAS 
IMPROPERLY DISMISSED AS TO GEORGE SCHONEY'S 
ESTATE. 
A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Defendant made an oral motion to dismiss the action as 
to George Schoney, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 25. (Tr. at p. 8). 
Defendant represented that a suggestion of death upon the record 
had been made more than 9 0 days before the hearing. (Tr. at. 
0.11). Defendant was referring to a statement in its motion for 
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summary judgment filed on December 29, 1987. (Id.). That 
motion, however, did not mention Rule 25, nor argue George 
Schoney's death as a basis for dismissal. 
B. No Proper Suooestion of Death Was Ever Made. 
A suggestion of death upon the record is a formal 
pleading. See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 30. A passing reference 
somewhere in the record to death of a party is insufficient. In 
Blair v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 104 F.R.D. 21 (W.D. Pa. 984) a 
reference to death of a party was made in a pleading. The court 
stated: 
This Court does not agree that the reference 
to plaintiff's death in the November 4, 1983 
pleading triggered the running of the 90 day 
time limit. Under Rule 25(a), the time for 
filing a motion for substitution commences 
only after the death of the party is formally 
suggested on the record by the filing and 
service of a written statement of the fact of 
death as provided in Rule 5 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Form 30. United 
States v. Killer Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 
1031, 1034 (10th Cir. 1974); Mobil Oil Corp. 
v. Lefkowitz, 454 F. Supp. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977). No such formal writing was filed in 
the instant case. The reference to the death 
of the plaintiff in the pleadings is not 
sufficient to trigger the running of the 90 
day time period. 
Likewise, in Pol gov v. Anderson, 45 F.R.D. 470 
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), the court held: 
A statement made in passing during a 
deposition is not "a statement of the fact 
of death: within the meaning of Rule 25. 
See Official Form 30 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Substitution may be made prior to 
service of the statement. 4 Moore's Federal 
Practice 25.-02, p. 62 (1967 Supp.). 
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Attorneys are sometimes so harassed during 
the course of a litigation that they may well 
overlook an informal suggestion of death. 
When the consequences to the client of a 
slightly delayed reaction may be severe and 
the burden of providing formal notice is 
slight, insistence on the observance of 
procedural ritual is justified. 
Similarly, an answer to interrogatory is not a proper 
suggestion of death: 
The incidental mention of the deaths in 
answers to interrogatories does not appear to 
this Court to have' started the 90-day period 
running. Federal Form 30 provides an example 
of the proper suggestion; the answers to 
interrogatories cited by defendants do not 
rise to the required level of formality. 
Acri v. Int. Ass'n of Mach. & Aero, wkrs., 5?5 F. Supp 326, 330 
(N.D. Cal. 1983) . 
No proper suggestion of death was ever made. A passing 
reference to death in an unrelated motion is insufficient. An 
answer to interrogatory is insufficient. The rules contemplate a 
formal pleading specifically referring to the provisions of Rule 
25. See Connelly v. Rathien, 547 P.2d 1336 (Utah 976) where 
dismissal was proper because "notice of death was duly made of 
record pursuant to Rule 25(a), U.R.C.P."; Nat. Eouio. Rental 
Ltd. v. Whitecraft Unl. Inc., 75 F.R.D. 507 (E.D.N.Y.1977)(ser-
vice of notice to file claim against estate is not proper 
suggestion of death). 
C. No Personal Service Was Mace Pursuant to Rule 25. 
Rule 25(a)(1) requires service of the suggestion of 
death to be made "upon persons not parties in the manner provided 
in Rule 4 for the service cf a summons. " Rule 4, in turn, 
requires personal service upon the executor or personal represen-
tative of the estate of George Schoney. Rule 4(e)(1). "The non-
parties for whom Rules 25(a)(1) and 4(d)(1) mandate personal 
service are evidently the 'successors or representatives of the 
deceased party'." Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 962 
(4 Cir. 1985). Defendant offered no evidence that it had served 
the non-party/ i.e. the estate of George Schoney. Defendant 
offered no evidence that an executor or personal representative 
had ever been appointed for George Schoney's estate. 
Service upon George Schoney's counsel was not suffi-
cient. 
Service on decedent's attorney above was 
inadequate. The attorney's agency to act 
ceases with the death of his client, see 
Restatement (Second) of Agency 120(1)(1958) 
and he has no power to continue or terminate 
an action on his own initiative. Because the 
attorney is neither a party nor a legal 
successor or representative of the estate, he 
has no authority to move for substitution 
under Rule 25(a)(1), as the courts have 
repeatedly recognized." Fariss v. Lunchburg 
Foundry, supra, 769 F.2d at 962. 
Also holding that the deceased's attorney "is not a 
representative of the deceased party in the sense contemplated 
by Rule 25(a)(1)" is Rende v. Kav, 415 F.2d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
See also Brown v. Must a in, 30 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 534 (4 Cir. 
1980)(decedent's attorney not a party or successor to party who 
can file suggestion of death); Al-Jurci v. Rochefelbs, 88 F.R.D. 
244 (W.D.N.Y.1980)(service must be made on estate unless estate's 
attorney agrees and is authorized to accept service of process.) 
Because George Schoneyrs attorney does not automatically 
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represent his estate, defendant has never properly served George 
Schoney's estate. 
POINT 
DEFENDANT'S OFFER OF JUDGMENT DID NOT MOOT 
THE SCHONEY'S CLAIMS 
A. The Trial Court Dismissed All the Schoney's Claims Because 
Defendant Offered to Rescind the Contract and Pay Restitu-
tion in the Amount of the Purchase Price Plus Interest. 
Defendant made an oral offer of judgment at the summary 
judgment hearing (Tr. at p. 13). The amount was $4,000 and was 
calculated by returning the money paid by the Schoney's plus 
interest. (Tr. at p. 19). Defendant seemed to argue that 
return of the money the Schoneys paid, plus interest, would 
"moot" all their damage claims. (Id.). The trial court 
apparently agreed and held that the Schoneys could never recover 
more than the $4,000 offered. (Tr. at p. 51). 
B. The Schonevs Did Not Seek Rescission and Restitution; 
Instead They Sougnt to Affirm the Contract and Recover 
Damaoes. 
The Schoney's Fifth Amended Complaint never sought 
recision and a refund of the money they had paid. Instead, they 
sought interest on the money they paid (damages for delay in 
building the Mountain View Mausoleum); the difference in value 
between the mausoleum as shown and the mausoleum as built 
(damages) and their share of the money earned by defendant in 
renting rhe cemetery chapel (damages for loss of use). Addition-
ally
 r the Schoney's sought an accounting of trust funds, which 
does not depend on a finding of breach cf contract. The Schoneys 
also sought damages for buying substitute mausoleum spaces 
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("cover" damages) and damages for their mental and emotional 
distress* Every remedy sought (except the trust accounting) was 
based on damages for breach of contract or tort. The Schoneys 
made no request for rescission of the contract. 
C. Election of Remedies Is Dp to the Schoneys, Not Defendant 
and the Trial Court. 
Ey offering rescission, defendant attempted to force an 
election of remedies on the Schoneys. Obviously, defendant feels 
it is cheaper to give the Schoneys their money back than to 
account for building an inferior mausoleum, renting out the 
cemetery chapel, abusing trust funds and obligations, and for 
mental distress caused by the lengthy delay in building the 
mausoleum. However, defendants are not allowed the option of 
choosing the least expensive remedy. If a plaintiff's damages 
exceed the purchase price, the plaintiff is free to seek damages. 
A plaintiff is entitled to an election of remedies 
"free of fraud or imposition." Angeles v. First Interstate Bank 
of Utah, 571 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1263). 
It is axiomatic that where a civil wrong 
gives rise to two or more causes of action, 
the choice of remedy is vested in the victim, 
not in the wrongdoer . . • It does not lie 
in the mouth of the wrongdoer ro demand that, 
his victim be limited to that cause of action 
which is most beneficial to tne wrong-doer. 
Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal. Rptr. 330, 343 (App. Ct. 1977) 
(Emphasis in the original.) 
The choice cf remedies belongs to the one who 
has been defrauded and may not be forced upon 
him by the wrongdoer. 
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Moore & Co. v. Williams, 657 P.2d 984, 988 (Colo App. 1982). See 
also Mills v. Brown, 568 S.W.2d 100 (Tenn. 1978) (purchaser's 
choice whether to seek rescission or damages; not up to vendor); 
Kino v. Lindlay, 697 S.W. 2d 749 (Tex. App. 1985) ( "Defendant may 
not dictate to a plaintiff which remedy he should pursue"). 
D. There was No Evidence that the Schoney's Damages Could Not 
Exceed $4,000. 
There was no basis for the trial court to conclude as a 
matter of law that the damages alleged would not exceed $4,000. 
Damages such as mental and emotional distress are not capable of 
ascertainment on summary judgment anyway, and must be left to a 
jury. Thus, defendant's offer of settlement was no basis for 
dismissing the Schoney's complaint. 
A procedure similar to that of Judge Moffat's was found 
reversible error in Jarrett v. G.L. Harper & Sons, Inc., 235 S.E. 
2d 362 (W. Va. 1977). After picking a jury, the defendant 
confessed judgment in the amount of the plaintiff's out-of-pocket 
expenses. After colloquy with plaintiff's counsel, the trial 
court dismissed the case. The appellate court reversed: 
The record discloses no explanation about how 
the trial court arrived at his decision to 
force acceptance of this confession of judg-
ment upon plaintiffs. . . [Wjhen a defen-
dant's offer of judgment only partially 
satisfies the plaintiff's claim for damages 
and plaintiff either rejects the tender or 
accepts it as part payment only, the court 
must consider the offer withdrawn and submit 
the case to the jury, whereas here one has 
been demanded. 
Id. at 363, 364. 
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Because the offer of judgment was only a partial 
satisfaction and w ^ rejected by the Schoneys
 f the trial court 
had no choice but to send the matter to a jury. 
E. The Schoneys' Complaint Should Not Have Been Discussed Even 
if their Damages Could Not Exceed $4,000, 
Assuming for sake of argument that the Schoneys' 
damages could not exceed $4,000, defendant's offer of judgment 
could not form the basis for dismissing their complaint. The 
dismissal deprived the Schoneys of both their cause of action 
and the $4,000 which defendant offered. An offer of judgment "is 
neither a defense to an action nor a bar to further prosecution 
of a suit." Katz Drug Co. v. Comm. Standard Ins., 647 S.W.2d 
831, 840 (Mo. App. 1983). "Defendant's reliance upon its offer 
of judgment as constituting an acceptable basis for the grant of 
summary judgment is misplaced. [It] is not a defense to an 
action and does not bar the further prosecution of a suit. 
[Citation omitted]. Killer v United Security Ins. Co., 496 S.W. 
2d 871, 876 (Mo. App. 1973). An offer of judgment is not a 
pleading, deposition, admission or affidavit which will support 
summary judgment. Id. 
What Judge Moffat did must be distinguished from the 
procedure occasionally used in class actions of offering judgment 
in excess of the named plaintiff's damages. This is done after 
class certification is denied and is done to avoid a useless 
trial. In those cases, the named plaintiff gets a judgment in 
his favor for the full amount of his individual damages. Even 
then, "a court may not impose upon a plaintiff a settlement that 
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deprives him of relief to which he could be entitled after 
trial. [Citation omitted]." Kline v. Wolf, 702 F.2d 400, 405 
(2d Cir. 1983). Part of the relief sought in a class action is 
class certification. Thus, a judgment in favor of an indivi-
dual named plaintiff must allow for appeal of the denial of 
class certification. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 
(5th Cir. 1978) affirmed sub. nom. Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v 
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S. Ct. 1166, 63 L. Ed.2d 427 (1980). 
This prevents a large defendant from avoiding class-wide 
accountability by paying off the named plaintiff's claims 
through an unaccepted offer of judgment. 
In this case, however, defendant used its unaccepted 
offer of judgment to avoid both class liability and liability 
to the Schoneys. This approach deprives the Schoneys of both 
the offered judgment and their causes of action. No plausible 
reasoning can support this result. 
DATED this /Q day of ]fi/lfyXA, , 1989. 
DAN IEL F. BERTCH
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-'-This brief is submitted in its current form pursuant to 
the order of March 7, 1989. Appellant submits it under protest 
that the order is incorrect and that the hearing panel will be 
unfairly hampered by the abbreviated nature of the brief. 
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